In his dramatic speech marking Ramadan's end, Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat gave up and claimed victory.

With his 15-month-long war of independence on the verge of military and diplomatic disaster, Arafat decided it was time to call an end to the fighting and a return to negotiations. Whether he has the willpower and political power to impose a cease-fire will only be seen in the coming days. Arafat appeared alert and energetic as he delivered his 25-minute message, though the effect was somewhat spoiled by wandering themes, needless repetition, and points only incompletely made.

The speech's main thrust was to persuade Palestinians and others that he is seriously seeking an end to the violence, but his explicit emphasis was on persuading Palestinians that none of the real problems they face actually exists:

* He told Palestinians they had won the battle with their steadfastness and sacrifice. In fact, they have lost both militarily and diplomatically. Israeli forces struck freely into the heart of Palestinian-ruled territory, bombing or advancing close to Arafat's own offices.

* He praised national unity extensively. Yet Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and even elements of his own Fatah group-albeit with Arafat's permission-defied the supposed orders that he gave publicly.

* He emphasized Palestinian democracy, noting the Palestinian Authority and legislature had been elected and promising new elections would be held when circumstances permitted. In fact, he himself and parliament were up for reelection early in the year 2000, at a very quiet time. The municipal elections were repeatedly promised but never held.

* He said Israel had launched a savage war on Palestinians, but never mentioned the Palestinians began the violence. Among themselves, they had presented the conflict as a war of independence that would only end when a state had been achieved. He did not mention the proposals made to him at Camp David or the Clinton plan he rejected, and there was also no mention of previous cease-fire pledges he had not implemented.

* He stressed the Palestinian leadership's credibility, saying when the PA takes a decision it will deliver results. In fact, the PA's credibility with Israel, the United States, and even Europe has sunk to its lowest point ever. There is serious doubt, which still remains, the PA will implement anything it promises.

* He spoke of international support for Palestinians, mentioning US President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell had expressed support for a Palestinian state. He also spoke of how the Arabs were standing by the Palestinians. He did not mention the loss of international support, including Arab inactivity and lack of financial support.

* He said Israeli pressure on the Palestinians will not achieve anything. But it in fact has achieved his decision to end the fighting.

Especially noticeable was his obsession with the concept of humiliation. No one will be allowed to humiliate the Palestinians.

Obviously, this has deep psychological implications to him. For Arafat, militancy and intransigence have been ways of countering humiliation by acting as if the balance of forces was on one's side when this is obviously not the case. The present circumstances are a good example of this situation.

The whole purpose of the speech, however, was to seek a cease-fire. He called on all Palestinians to stop fighting, explicitly called for an end to suicide bombings, and warned militants who continue fighting they will be subject to arrest. Arafat self-consciously repeated these points so his seriousness would be evident, asserting he has already tried his best to ensure a cease-fire prevails.

Arafat justified this step in two ways. First, he falsely stated the Palestinians had always favored a cease-fire, but Israel had blocked this from happening. Second, he told his people that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is the one who really wants fighting to continue.

Third, Arafat hinted, but did not quite say, that Sharon wants to destroy the PA. Thus, he executed a complete turnaround in policy without admitting it. Formerly, continuing the battle was the heroic Palestinian war of independence to force Israel to withdraw. Now, ending the fighting is a clever Palestinian strategy to outwit Sharon.

Fourth, by saying the Palestinians were defending themselves against aggression, he had long sought a cease-fire and worked hard to ensure one, and he was again inviting Israel to return to negotiations, Arafat tried to preempt the role of peacemaker.

He praised the Mitchell Commission recommendations, said they are a basis for solving the conflict, and the Palestinians want to implement them.

Actually, though, the recommendations largely provided for a cease-fire, a freeze on settlements, and a renewal of negotiations. Consequently, even implementation of this plan would only take the parties back to where they were-in deadlock, last year.

Arafat stressed, as always, the Palestinians' goal is an independent state with its capital in Jerusalem, adding a solution would be based on land for peace and this state would live alongside Israel. But Arafat also slipped in a reference to UN General Assembly Resolution 194, which Palestinians use to justify a "right of return" for all Palestinians to live in Israel.

Three uncompleted points were also of interest. Arafat mentioned the US war against terrorism and the September 11 attacks on New York as factors affecting the Palestinian cause. But he did not explain how they affected it-by reducing international support for the Palestinians, producing pressure on them to act against terrorism, and increasing sympathy for Israel.

He also made a passing reference to the Sharm e-Sheikh negotiations of early 2001. While Arafat did not make this clear, he certainly prefers this as the starting point for renewed negotiations in which he can demand even more Israeli concessions.

Finally, he spoke about what he termed a real Palestinian state, which could refer to arguments that Israeli offers were insufficient to produce genuine independence.

Throughout his career, Arafat has never used his position to educate Palestinians about the political situation and their alternatives.

He generally restricts himself to trying to excite emotions, exhort action, or pass down orders. Although he said near the beginning of his speech it would be a heart-to-heart talk in which he would explain the situation to Palestinians, he did not do so.

One problem arising from Arafat's style is Palestinians in the street might well ask why they should quit their war if, in fact, they are winning it. Once again, Arafat-in this case, probably unintentionally-encourages militancy at the moment he is trying to calm things down. If he gave Palestinians a realistic assessment of their problems he would be doing them more of a favor and acting more effectively to achieve his stated goal of ending the violence and pursuing successful negotiations.

In reality, of course, the speech constituted an attempt to reverse completely his own policy while making it seem he is continuing a long-standing strategy, or at least building on still another Palestinian victory. No one will believe that claim. The key question, however, remains as to whether Arafat's firm words will lead to a real cease-fire or merely be a substitute for action on his part.

(The writer is director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center of the Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center and editor of MERIA Journal.)