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Parshas Kedoshim: Kiruv Rechokim No definitive Halacha LeMa'aseh conclusions should be applied to practical situations based on any of these Shiurim.
We find in this Parsha a Posuk which forbids one to hate a fellow Jew and then commands one to rebuke a fellow Jew who commits a transgression (Vayikra 19:17). The Ramban, in his commentary on the Torah (Ibid.), explains the connection between these two parts of the Posuk by saying that one should not hate someone who commits a sin, but one should rather reproach that person and show him the correct way to behave. This is the Mitzvah of Hocheiach Tochiach, as discussed in the Gemara in Erchin (16b). The Ramban (Ibid.) adds that the conclusion of the Posuk (Ibid.) implies that one who fails to observe this Mitzvah will himself be blamed for the other person's transgressions, as suggested in the Targum Onkelos there (Ibid.). This idea is supported by the Mishnah and Gemara in Shabbos (54b) which blames one of the Tannaim himself for a sin committed by his neighbor because he didn't reproach that neighbor. The Rambam (Hilchos Deios 6:6,7) consequently rules that one should not keep quiet when seeing another person sin, but should speak to the person nicely and object to the sin which has been committed, rather than bear a grudge against him. The next Posuk in this Parsha (Ibid. Posuk 18) contains the famous dictum "V'Ahavta L'Rayacha K'Mocha", "Love your neighbor as yourself," which, as the Yerushalmi in Nedarim (9:4, 30b) states, Rabbi Akiva held to be the key principle of the entire Torah. The Rashbam, in commenting on that Posuk (Ibid. s.v. V'Ahavta) writes that this requirement to love one's neighbor applies only if that neighbor is a good person. At first glance, this would seem to indicate that if one has a wicked neighbor, he may hate him, which would contradict the opening phrase of the previous Posuk (Ibid. Posuk 17) as discussed above. The Rambam (Ibid. Halachah 3) rules that one is required to love every Jew as he loves himself. The Hagahos Maimoniyos (Ibid. Os 1) qualifies this, however, by limiting this requirement and stating that one must love only a fellow Jew who observes the Torah and its Mitzvos, as opposed to a wicked person whom one can hate; this too seems to contradict the prohibition to hate cited above. He resolves the problem by defining as a wicked person only one who refuses to accept the Tochachah, the rebuking, of another, implying clearly that one must first attempt to reproach the other person and warn him as to the correct path. Until one has done this, he must indeed love this fellow Jew, like all others; only after this fellow Jew has refused to accept this Tochachah may he be disliked. This idea appears to be corroborated by the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 272:11). Interestingly, the Rambam (Hilchos Mamrim 3:3) writes that certain people are in an entirely different category because they were never educated in the proper way to begin with. They are like children who were kidnapped and raised among non-Jews and therefore, through no fault of their own, they are unfamiliar with Torah and Mitzvos. Such people, says the Rambam (Ibid.), must be encouraged to repent by attracting them to return to the Torah. We thus see that the effort must be made to engage in Kiruv Rechokim, to bring back those who are far off the path of Torah. In his Sefer HaMitzvos, the Rambam (Mitzvos Aseh 3) includes this idea as a part of the Mitzvah of loving Hashem; the Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 239 Os 4) equates this to saving a person's life and returning to a person his lost property. In more modern times, the Chofetz Chaim, in an essay called Chizuk HaDas among other places, writes of the tremendous importance of Kiruv Rechokim. The Chazon Ish (Chelek Yorah Deah Hilchos Shechitah Siman 2 Sif Katan 16) also stresses that we must all reach out with words of love and try our utmost to bring people back to the light of Torah. It is worth noting that it appears that the obligation of Kiruv Rechokim applies not only to the individual, but to the community as well. The Gemara in Shevuos (39a) learns from a Posuk elsewhere in the Torah (Ibid. 26:37) that there is a principle called Areivus, which means that every Jew is responsible, like a guarantor, for every other Jew. This principle takes Kiruv Rechokim beyond the realm of the Mitzvah of Hocheiach Tochiach, because that Mitzvah implies only that one must help a fellow Jew take care of his spiritual needs. Areivus, however, implies that one must treat a fellow Jew's spiritual needs as if they were in fact his own needs. This explains why, as mentioned above, one can be blamed for a sin committed by another person, just as a guarantor on a loan can be forced to pay the money if the borrower defaults. The Gemara in Sotah (37b) implies that this principle of Areivus went into effect only once the Jews entered Eretz Yisrael, specifically, when the new Bris was established at Har Gerizim and Har Eival (Yehoshua Perek 8). This Bris, as the Torah implies (Devarim 29:13-19) was established not with individuals but with the collective Jewish community, and it would thus seem that the obligation of Areivus is likewise a communal obligation. Indeed, Rav Yerucham Perlow, in his commentary to the Sefer HaMitzvos of Rabbeinu Saadyah Gaon (Parshah 57) points out that the Geonim enumerate the law of Areivus as a Mitzvah upon the Tzibbur. Apparently, there is also this communal obligation of Kiruv Rechokim which goes beyond the individual obligation of Hocheiach Tochiach. The Mishnah in Pirkei Avos (5:22) states that one who brings merit to the community will be saved from sinning himself; the Meiri there (Beis HaBechirah Ibid.) comments that this is the most righteous thing one can do. Likewise, the Gemara in Tamid (28a) indicates that one who reproaches another properly earns a place with Hashem. |