by Alex Grobman, Ph.D.

German Acts of Antisemitism

When Rabbi Nathan Baruch, director of the Vaad Hatzala in Germany, began visiting Displaced Persons (DP) camps in Germany in mid-1946, he discovered that antisemtism continued to be a problem for the Jews in the camps. Much of their difficulties were the same as those encountered by the occupying American forces. Each camp had extraterritorial status that precluded Germans from entering, but wherever there was a camp, there were Germans who sought to cause trouble. Often they petitioned the military authorities to take action against the DPs or incited the DPs themselves.

As the Americans reduced their troop strength in Germany this situation grew worse. Some Germans displayed their antisemitism openly, directing their hostility toward the Jewish DPs, blaming them for shortages in food, housing, fuel and clothing. Jews were resented for receiving special privileges in housing and food, too. Jews were abused in public, had stones thrown through their windows and to add further insult the Germans sang antisemitic songs in the streets.1 Jews from Eastern Europe were particularly vulnerable to physical attacks because the Nazi stereotype labeled them "sub-humans." They were vilified for "controlling the black market and causing problems that impeded the restoration of Germany."2

Only a minority of the German population supported these acts, which were officially renounced by the German authorities. A number of non-Jewish Germans who also suffered under the Nazis expressed their solidarity with the Jews, but most Germans and officials reacted with "total insensitivity and indifference." This insensitivity was so ingrained that when Jewish officials in Dusseldorf reopened their community institutions after the war, a municipal official presented them with a writ of attachment to collect property taxes from 1938-1945. Significantly, the writ passed through several bureaucratic levels before it was personally delivered to the Jewish community leaders.3

When members of the Committee for Social Policy of the Bavarian Parliament discussed DPs, they did so in terms generally reserved for criminals. In debates describing the DP camp at Kaltherberge, the Committee referred to the centers as "hideouts for unsavory elements not accessible to any German authorities" and suggested the time had come for "law and order be created there."4

In a closed session of the ruling conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) in 1947, Bavarian Agricultural Minister Josef Baumgartner said: "Without the Jews and particularly the Jewish businessmen in the U.S.A. and the rest of the world we will never manage: We need them for the resumption of our old trade relations!" With regard to the Ostjüden (Jews from the East) living in Germany, he said he had little use for them at all. After attending the Jewish Congress meeting in Bad Reichenhall, he noted that "the one pleasing thing about the meeting for me was the resolution that was unanimously adopted: Out of Germany." His colleagues laughed.5

At the same time, the desecration of Jewish cemeteries reached epidemic proportions. This was not a common manifestation of antisemitism, and many of the top military leaders in Germany recognized this as a "brazen challenge to the authority of the United States Occupation Forces." Unofficially, some considered the desecrations "as a trial balloon launched by the Germans to see how far they can go without inviting reprisals on the part of the Army."6

William Haber, Adviser on Jewish Affairs to the Theater Commander of the U.S. Forces in Europe, urged General Lucius Clay, Military Governor of Germany, to issue a public statement "denouncing the wanton destruction of these cemeteries." 7 He asked the General to confer with the heads of the German states to explain the need for German authorities to stop the desecration; to require that they repair the damage; and that guards be posted. Until the German authorities demonstrated a willingness to apprehend offenders and punish them, the Military Government would continue to investigate and try the offenders.8

Antisemitism continued to be an issue for the entire DP period. In December 1948, Haber concluded, "[I]t is almost hopeless to expect much progress in this field for the foreseeable future."9 From his own discussions with Germans of different economic strata, including professionals and trade unionists, he learned that "the anti-Jewish psychosis is so thoroughly imbedded in the German mind that it will take generations of re-education to make much headway with this problem."10

Most people he spoke to believed that antisemitism "is now more deep-seated than in Hitler’s day and that it has spread to the working class, which was relatively cooler than most German groups" to Hitler’s antisemitism. This could be attributed to the lack of progress in establishing democratic institutions and popular support for democratic ideals. "All the bombs that fell on the Germans have not shaken them out of their dreams and those dreams have not included devotion to democratic ideals. Little is to be gained by investing money and effort in fighting anti-semitism [sic] in Germany." 11

Haber saw no point in staying in Germany. Labor leaders made it clear that there was no room for Jews in the German economy and that "most people are agreed...when the American forces leave Germany, overt acts would be directed against Jews."12

Because of the continuing tension between the Germans, Army personnel and the DPs, there were often confrontations. One incident created an international furor.

In May 1947, a harried and distraught Rabbi Yossel Friedenson, a survivor of Auschwitz-Birkenau and five other camps, banged on Rabbi Baruch’s door in Pasing, a suburb of Munich. Somehow he had managed to get from Munich to Pasing in the middle of the night to ask for help on a matter of great importance. He excitedly told a story about a group of rabbis, members of Agudath Israel, who were arrested and being detained by the Army. Some of them had been shot at, some of them had been injured. The scene was one of total bedlam.

According to Friedenson, the group came from different camps to discuss religious matters. Those who were schoctim, who ritually slaughter kosher meat, came to discuss where they would go to work, and were meeting in the backroom of a German guesthouse. Unfortunately there was a bar in the front. The rabbis were in the midst of their discussions when a couple of drunken GIs, in the company of similarly intoxicated German women, entered the premises. Though the bar was off limits to military personnel, they barged in and, at the instigation of their female companions, abused and beat the rabbis. Somebody called the MPs, and when they arrived, the soldiers screamed that the Jews—most of them bearded—were making anti-American comments and that they had indignantly decided to break up the meeting. When the MPs arrived with guns drawn the rabbis became frightened and some tried to flee through a window. Shots were fired and Friedenson didn’t know exactly what happened. Twelve Jews were taken to the hospital. Among the injured were 70-year-old Rabbi Israel Goldberg and Rabbi Isaac Zemba. Rabbi Eliezer Weinberger of the Ulm DP camp had broken his legs as he and Rabbi Moshe Blau of Bad Reichenall jumped out a window. Somehow Friedenson got away and drove to Pasing. 13

Friedenson, Rabbi Baruch and his assistant Rabbi Aviezer Burstin immediately drove to Munich. At MP headquarters they witnessed an incredible scene. All the rabbis at the meeting, on the word of the GIs, had been apprehended and arrested for disturbing the peace. The MP captain had already written a report based on the testimonies of the inebriated soldiers and their women. No statement was taken from the rabbis because they didn’t speak English, and, after all, here were American GIs who could attest to the anti-American conversation. Rabbi Baruch asked the captain to show him the report he was submitting to Brigadier General Josiah Dalby, commander of the Munich area. The "witnesses" painted a very self-serving picture.

General Dalby soon arrived, took the file and went into his office. Baruch explained what happened and brought in Rabbi Goldberg, one of the participants, and some other rabbis and said, "Look at the prisoners…These are the innocents who have been so unjustly accused."14

The General immediately understood what had happened. Charges were filed against the GIs. A subsequent news article reported that "Military authorities concede that…[the complainants] were [made] under the influence of alcohol when the incident occurred." General Dalby denied, however, that there had been any excessive mistreatment of the DPs, although he did confirm that all the rabbis had been forced to line up with their hands in the air and were struck with truncheons by the military police if they lowered them. He expressed regret concerning the incident explaining that it had occurred spontaneously and was the result of alleged provocation and misunderstanding.

As a result of their negotiations, Baruch made friends with Dalby that day. Dalby promised to use the case to teach troops how to behave with DPs. Because they amicably handled a potentially explosive affair, Dalby helped Rabbi Baruch whenever he could. In the meantime, the news had gotten back to New York and the Agudah Israel(Agudah) sent someone to file a protest in Washington. Rabbi Baruch felt that this wasn’t wise or prudent, but the Agudah insisted on protesting to the War Department. Eventually, the matter quietly died.15

German Police and the DPs

The German police wanted to control the DP camps and often found excuses to raid them. The DPs were outraged, but the Germans continually sought ways to enter in "hot pursuit" of suspects who allegedly violated regulations outside camp environs.

The Military Government and prominent members of the German administration saw the German ability to gain access to the camps as a "sure way" of responding to black market activity conducted in German cities and towns. According to military occupation guidelines, the camps were outside the jurisdiction of the German police and the police complained that they were unable to enforce the law. German police could only enter a Jewish camp when accompanied by American military personnel, in order to identify DPs who allegedly committed offenses "outside." The German police had to be unarmed. And then on February 18, 1947 the Bavarian Deputy Minister President complained if they didn’t have total access that German police could not enforce German laws. In the previous three months, he said, German police were forced to stop at camp gates 520 times.16

A substantial number of Army officers, especially in the American Military Government, agreed with him. As of June 1948, some 140,000 DPs were living outside the camps and had adjusted to German control. Therefore, they reasoned, those in the camps should be subject to the same indigenous German regulations. Haber argued that there was a vital difference between DPs who lived outside, where they interacted with the German police on an individual basis, and those who lived in the camps, where DP antipathy to Germans was more pronounced.17

The Advisors on Jewish Affairs thwarted attempts to change the status quo by "convincing the members of the Civil Affairs Division, who [were] pressing for the change, that it would be imprudent to turn German police loose on the DPs before the size of the problem had been substantially reduced."18 The advisors maintained that the "immunity against surveillance by the German police was the only differential that the Jewish DPs enjoyed…." General Clay supported them and said that even when Germany became a western state, the American military would retain the responsibility for the Displaced Persons.19

General Clay insisted that as long as he was the military governor he would not surrender the sovereignty of the camps to the Germans, maintaining the position set forth by General Joseph T. McNarney, his predecessor. (McNarney was Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces of Occupation in Germany, from November 1945 until March 1947.) A combat general, McNarney witnessed the atrocities, havoc and destruction wrought by the Nazis. As liberators, he and the men under his command saw the living skeletons lying in the bunkers and the masses of dead. They hated the Germans, but soon these soldiers rotated home; their replacements had no idea of what their charges had gone through.

Initially, "[the] troops considered all Germans as ‘krauts,’...but many soon discovered that the former Nazi officials at least knew how to address an officer and could help the Americans locate good houses, liquor, and women. And so the local U.S. Army colonel’s secretary was a former SS girl, and an ex-SS trooper in the district got rich on illegal sales and purchases, made possible by helping Americans in black market deals. Similarly, Americans in charge of construction crews favored German POWs as workers over DPs or Italian POWs; the Germans were ‘generally industrious, obedient and well-behaved.’ More and more, incoming American soldiers from 1946 onward found it difficult to square the image of a bloodthirsty Nazi with the neat, clean, orderly world they found among Germans. DPs seemed less desirable...[All this] pointed to a division, a gulf, in occupation policy: At the upper levels there was great concern for the DPs and their plight. But at lower, operational levels, American and British soldiers often shifted their preference to the Germans...‘The Germans gradually conditioned the military officers and military government to regard the DPs as inferior and undeserving people.’"20

The Civil Affairs Division requested revisions of law enforcement in the DP camps to permit pre-trial incarceration of camp residents in German jails and to allow "pinpoint searches." These were search-and-seizure operations targeted against named individuals, in which no more than fifty German law enforcement officials could participate, when accompanied by an equal number of United States military personnel. Based on previous experiences with post-trial confinement of Jewish DPs in German jails, Haber approved this change, but protested against German police conducting pinpoint searches. Haber knew that the German and U.S. Military Government sources would continue to push for German control of law enforcement in the camps until they got what they wanted.21

In a statement on July 27, 1947, made before the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry M. Sage, Chief of the Field Contact Section at the Headquarters of European Command in Frankfurt, observed "some exaggerated reports of DP misbehavior" because the "DPs have always been a good source of news." Incidents involving DPs which are "handled by our military agencies, attracts more attention than a similar incident involving Germans, which is handled by German police." 22

Sage’s office was responsible for maintaining law and order among all the DPs, and keeping the records of incidents involving them. He personally assisted in arresting and prosecuting some of the DPs. While there were some who violated the law, Sage found that information from the German Bureau of Criminal Identification and Statistics, noted that "non-Germans have committed proportionately less [crimes] than the Germans."23

The Advisors saw the raids as retribution and the assessment of collective blame. They argued that the use of collective guilt was inconsistent with American justice. The raids reminded people of their experiences under the Nazis. They exacerbated relations between the U.S. Army and the DPs, and made it seem as if the Americans supported antisemitism.

The Advisors tried to stop the raids but were ignored. Typically, when the Americans launched a "search- and-seizure" raid on a DP camp, U.S. Military Police generally entered at dawn, and roused the people from their beds and ordered them outside. Sometimes the Army would surround the camp with tanks and half-tracks—the same tactics used to overpower a hostile force. Some DPs felt sorry for the soldiers who were placed in such a humiliating position. At no time, however, did the raids ever uncover large-scale black market activities. The soldiers sometimes found food that had been acquired by bartering items received from the Army and Jewish relief organizations. The DPs used the food to obtain what their diet lacked: proteins, fats, fresh fruit and vegetables. Most of what the Army confiscated was procured in the legitimate market. When the DPs could prove their case, the soldiers returned the items to their owners—unless they kept them for themselves.24

A raid at the Zeilsheim camp on March 24, 1948 was typical. They came ostensibly to look for caches of dynamite, but no explosives were found. Of the half dozen people arrested for alleged possession of black market items, only three were brought to trial—two were acquitted and one received a minor sentence. The Provost Marshal, who conducted the raid, told Haber in confidence that he thought the mass raids were not "worth a damn."25

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Number 96 was another point of contention between the DPs and the Army. Promulgated by the military in April 1948, it gave the Germans full benefit of Anglo-American safeguards in search-and-seizure operations. Mass raids on Germans were strictly prohibited and German homes could be searched only with a warrant issued with probable cause. DPs were excluded from this directive. A significant number of people involved directly and indirectly in law enforcement personally resented the DPs being relegated to second-class status. They cited the directive as an example of the convoluted thinking on the part of some members of the occupation forces charged with implementing occupation policy.26

On December 9, 1949 the raids on Jewish and non-Jewish camps were terminated when the Army finally realized they were worthless exercises in law enforcement.27

Black Market

Why did the Army pursue such a vigorous search-and-seizure policy against the Jewish DPs? According to Abraham Hyman, Assistant Advisor on Jewish Affairs and later, the last Advisor, the Army "was obsessed with what it regarded as its primary mission in Germany, helping Germany’s economic recovery. He believed that by disregarding the harm the black market caused the German economy and using the camps as the base of their operations, the Jews gave the impression that they dominated the black market..." Jews were "probably not more numerous than their non-Jewish counterparts…but they were more brazen…. Having been stripped of their possessions and left orphaned by the Germans, they felt no obligation to consider the harm the black market might be causing the German economy." In a certain sense, Hyman believed the Jews helped bring this situation upon themselves.28

What was the nature of black market activities? The value of the German currency was approximately 300 marks to the American dollar—good enough only to buy designated rations supplied to the Germans or a few other available commodities. The American Army paid indigenous personnel with these almost worthless marks, but compensated them further with PX privileges. There they found the mother lode: American cigarettes. Europeans were addicted to tobacco: It was a common sight to see Germans picking up discarded American cigarette butts in the streets of Munich. Holocaust survivors were no exception. Burstin recounted how he would give up his meager slice of bread in the concentration camps for a cigarette or part of a cigarette.

Cigarettes were plentiful in Germany. The Americans brought in shiploads that were available in the Post Exchanges to authorized personnel—soldiers, officers, members of those organizations attached to and recognized by UNRRA and the American Army. Those who were authorized had the privilege of purchasing cigarettes, coffee and other commodities in the PX—precious items that made their way unto the black market. 29

As of mid-1948 the number of people involved in the black-market was estimated "at a minimum of 30%." This did not include those in the "gray market or the basic food market. The luxury market, as contrasted to the basic food market, range[d] from single dealings in American Post Exchange (PX) items to carloads of cigarettes. The earnings in this market likewise range[d] from a few American dollars per year to 60 or 70 thousand dollars a year."30

Typically, Germans blamed the Jews for the entire black market. For many Jews, the black market was the primary place to barter for food, clothing and whatever else they could not find from other sources. But American soldiers were the most blatant participants in the black market.

Most of this corruption was caused by "cigarette power." "A pack of 20 cigarettes would sell for $15…At the Post Exchange (PX) a carton [of 10 packs] cost 70 cents, and GIs were allowed to purchase one carton a week. A soldier who did not smoke could buy his carton, sell it and take a $149.30 profit."31 Soldiers "in Berlin in one month, October 1945, sent home $84 million more dollars than they earned." 32 Officers were "usually the biggest operators in the markets, leaving the work on their desks to make deals in the street." The Army did not respond quickly to the problem perhaps because "the practice was so prevalent and involved so many high ranking officers, it was difficult to know where and how to start a stiff program of correction." Because black market activities among the Americans were so ubiquitous, many Germans came to view them as "fundamentally dishonest and weak."33

Eventually, the Army could not ignore the problem because it represented a breakdown in discipline. General McNarney initiated a crackdown in April 1946.

Because cigarettes were such a vital commodity, Rabbi Baruch used them as a source of cash for his Vaad activities. In a June 10, 1947 letter, Rabbi Baruch informed Pincus Schoen, executive director of the Vaad Hatzala in New York, that his food supplies had dwindled until they were almost bare. But the demand for food was increasing. Rabbi Baruch contacted Stephen Klein, founder of the Barton Bonbonieere chocolate company and chairman of the Vaad's immigration committee, hoping to hear some good news to help relieve the "endless pressure" that he was encountering. He had previously spoken to Klein about shipping quantities of cigarettes because of their great commercial value but assumed that Klein was so preoccupied with the political problems of the Agudas Harabonim that he needed reminding to ensure support for the program in Europe.34

Though cigarettes were very important to Rabbi Baruch’s operations, their use involved a great deal of paperwork. As Rabbi Baruch reported: " I first had to submit an application stating how many cigarettes would be imported, where they would be coming from, whether I was purchasing them or were they a gift and what purpose would they be used for in the American Zone of Occupation in Germany. Before submitting the request, I had to prepare a full detailed report in triplicate to the of the International Refugee Organization on how the previous shipment had been distributed. Once I received a new shipment, a similar report would have to be submitted in triplicate on a monthly basis."35

U.S. Army and the Jewish DPs

Many of the problems the survivors had in Germany might have been eased or not existed had the American military understood their unique situation and needs. After the war, the best estimate of the number of Jews in Europe was about 250,000. In the American Zone, excluding the American enclave of Berlin where there were about 6,000 Jews, there were 126,563 Jews on December 31, 1946; 123,778 on Jun. 1,1947; and 30,408 on June 30, 1949. By June 30, 1950 the number had dwindled to 10,909. Approximately 30,000 to 40,000 Jewish DPs lived in the cities and towns. In May 1947, when the Jewish DP population was at its highest level, "there were 60 assembly centers, 14 children’s homes, 38 hachsharot [training centers to prepare people to live in Palestine], 17 hospitals, a convalescent home, three rest centers, three sanitariums, one transit camp, one staging area and 139 community groups in the U.S. zone and two assembly centers in the U.S. enclave in Berlin."29

One of the fundamental errors the Army made in dealing with the Jewish DPs was that it failed to adhere to the Handbook for Military Government in Germany, prepared by SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces) in December 1944, mandating that "inmates of concentration camps should be, if under restraint by the German authorities on racial, political, or religious grounds, treated as United Nations displaced persons…." Instead DPs were segregated according to their nationality. This meant that Jews from Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Romania and Italy were identified as former "enemy nationals" not entitled to the special care and attention accorded citizens of UN countries. It also meant that they were placed in camps with some of their former persecutors and those who had collaborated with the Nazis.36

By design, the British military followed the same policy as the Americans. As the British Minister informed the Americans, "His Majesty’s Government are not in favor of a policy of segregation of Jews or non-repatriables as such, since they are unwilling to recognize Nazi attempts to deprive Jews of their German or any other nationality, or Jewish attempts to regard Jews as possessing any separate or over-riding nationality of their own as distinct from their political nationality." The British viewed all displaced persons as "ultimately repatriable until it has been proved finally and irrefutably that they are not repatriable." As a result of this policy, most Jewish DPs made their way into the American zones in Germany and Austria, where they were subjected to the aforementioned antisemitism.37

Exasperation with the Jews remaining in Germany continued to foment a climate of ill will and conflict. Oscar A. Mintzer, the JDC legal advisor for the American Zone of Germany, conducted a study and concluded that there were "frequent instances of arrests by either the military or German police merely on suspicion alone, and of the conviction and imprisonment of Jews based simply on suspicion with little supporting evidence." There were "frequent beatings, robbery, and other mistreatment of displaced persons (not only Jewish displaced persons) by arresting officers, both military and German."38

Mintzer noted an incident where some drunken GIs stopped Jews and beat them to amuse their German girlfriends, and one involving German police who beat up four boys rummaging through an empty lot.

Mintzer believed that this hostility was also "a result of the general deterioration of the political and social status of the Jew, and his increasing feeling of being pushed around by German and [American] military authorities…" There was a feeling of "no real liberation and very little hope." Mintzer observed that incidents "would continue and increase, unless some basic changes occur. The people don’t want to stay in Germany; they hate Germany, and they are losing patience and becoming hostile and aggressive."39

In 1947 Rabbi Baruch wrote to William Boe of the Voluntary Services Division of UNNRA: "More than two years after the great liberation, our people still find themselves upon the cursed bloody soil of Germany…Our people are growing very restless, unwilling to work for the reconstruction of the German economy, to give of their strength and knowledge to the rebuilding of the country that has given birth to their annihilators."40

1 Report of Philip S. Bernstein, Advisor on Jewish Affairs U.S. Zones, Europe: May 1946 to August 1947.": 4. Author’s file.

2 Michael Brenner, After The Holocaust: Rebuilding Jewish Lives In Postwar Germany (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995) 52-53; William Haber to the American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Conference, American Jewish Distribution Committee, Jewish Agency for Palestine and World Jewish Congress December 20, 1948: 21.

3 Brenner, 54.

4 Brenner, 54-5

5 Brenner, 55.

6 William Haber to American Jewish Committee, Jewish Agency for Palestine, American Jewish Distribution Committee, American Jewish Committee and World Jewish Congress June 10, 1948, 11. Author’s file.

7 Haber, 11-12. Author’s file.

8 Haber, 11-12. Author’s file.

9 William Haber to the American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Conference, American Jewish Distribution Committee, Jewish Agency for Palestine and World Jewish Congress December 20, 1948, 21.

10 Haber 21.

11 Haber, 21.

12 Haber, 21-22.

13 "U.S. Military Admits Guilt of Soldiers Who Assaulted Jewish DPs" American Jewish Outlook May 2, 1947; "American Military Police Attack Munich Agudist Conference. Rabbis Injured" The Jewish Weekly May 2,1947; "MPs in Germany Assault Rabbis at Meeting," Trends of Events, May 2, 1947.

14 Interview Rabbi Nathan Baruch, September 2000.

15 Interview with Rabbi Nathan Baruch, September 2000.

16 Haber, June 10, 1948, 7. Author’s file; William Haber to the American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Conference, American Jewish Distribution Committee, Jewish Agency for Palestine and World Jewish Congress, February 34, 1948:3-4.

17 Haber, June 10, 1948: 7. Author’s file; Haber, February 34, 1948, 3-4.

18 Haber, December 20, 1948, 8.

19 Haber, December 20, 1948,8.

20 Mark Wyman, DP: Europe’s Displaced Persons: 1945-1951 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), 173-174.

21 Haber, June 10, 1948, 7-8.

22 Statement By Lieutenant-Colonel Jerry M. Sage, United States Army, Headquarters of European Command, Frankfurt, Germany, Before the House and Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization July 2. 1947, 6 Author’s file.

23 Statement By Lieutenant-Colonel Jerry M. Sage.

24 Abraham S. Hyman, The Undefeated. (Jerusalem: Gefen,1993) 290-291.

25 Haber, June 10, 1948, 13.

26 Haber, June 10, 1948, 13.

27 Hyman, 293.

28 Hyman, 294.

29 Interview with Rabbi Nathan Baruch, September 2000.

30 Abraham Klausner, "Jewish Displaced Persons in the American Occupied Zone of Germany" to American Jewish Conference, May 1948: 2. Author’s file.

31 Edward N. Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977) 91-92.

32 Peterson, 91.

33 Peterson, 91.

34 Rabbi Nathan Baruch to Pincus Schoen June 10, 1947 Rabbi Nathan Baruch files.

35 Daniel Adelson to Rabbi Nathan Baruch May 21, 1948. Rabbi Nathan Baruch files. See also John C.Parker to whom it may concern October 23, 1947. Author’s file.

36 Leonard Dinnerstein, "The U.S. Army and the DP’s: Policies Toward The Displaced Persons After World War II," American Jewish History, Vol. LXVIII, Number 3: 355.

37 Dinnerstein, 356.

38 Alex Grobman, In Defense of the Survivors: The Letters and Documents of Oscar A. Mintzer, AJDC Legal Advisor, Germany, 1945-46 (Berkeley: Judah L. Magnes Museum, 1999), 235.

39 Grobman, 235.

40 "Continuation of Vaad Program and future plans of operation." Rabbi Nathan Baruch to W.S. Boe, Chief Voluntary Agencies Division, PCIRO Sub-Zone Hq., Pasing-Munich, APO 407. October 20, 1947. Rabbi Nathan Baruch files: 2, 7.

Dr. Alex Grobman

Dr. Alex Grobman is an historian with an MA and Ph.D. in contemporary Jewish history from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He is president of the Institute for Contemporary Jewish Life, a think tank dealing with historical and contemporary issues affecting the Jewish community, and a consultant to the Brenn Institute.

Dr. Grobman established the first Holocaust center in the U.S. under the auspices of a Jewish Federation in St. Louis, Missouri and served as its first director. He also served as director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angles where he was the founding editor-in chief of the Simon Wiesenthal Annual, the first serial publication in the United States focusing on the scholarly study of the Holocaust. Dr. Grobman edited Genocide: Critical Issues of the Holocaust, a companion to the Center's Academy Award winning film Genocide.

Dr. Grobman is the author of Rekindling the Flame: American Jewish Chaplains and the Survivors of European Jewry, 1944-1948, and editor of In Defense of the Survivors: The Letters and Documents of Oscar A. Mintzer AJDC Legal Advisor, Germany, 1945-46. His latest book Denying History: Who Says the Holocaust Never Happened, and Why Do They Say It? was published in hardcover by the University of California Press in Berkeley in spring 2000 and in paperback in May 2002. He has also edited three academic books: Anne Frank in Historical Perspective, Those Who Dared: Rescuers and Rescued, and Schindler's List.

He latest book Out of the Depths of Despair: The Vaad Hatzala in Post-War Europe will be published in 2002.

(The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of Tzemach Dovid)